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Abstract—For state-of-the-art network function virtualization
(NFV) systems, it remains a key challenge to conduct effective ser-
vice chain composition for different network services (NSs) with
ultra-low request latencies and minimum network congestion. To
this end, existing solutions often require full knowledge of the
network state, while ignoring the privacy issues and overlooking
the non-cooperative behaviors of users. What is more, they
may fall short in the face of unexpected failures such as user
unavailability and virtual machine breakdown. In this paper,
we formulate the problem of service chain composition in NFV
systems with failures as a non-cooperative game. By showing that
such a game is a weighted potential game and exploiting the
unique problem structure, we propose two effective distributed
schemes that guide the service chain compositions of different NSs
towards the Nash equilibrium (NE) state with both near-optimal
latencies and minimum congestion. Besides, we develop two novel
learning-aided schemes as comparisons, which are based on
deep reinforcement learning (DRL) and Monte Carlo tree search
(MCTS) techniques, respectively. Our theoretical analysis and
simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed
schemes, as well as the adaptivity when faced with failures.
Index Terms—NFV, service chain composition, quality of ser-
vice, non-cooperative game, deep reinforcement learning, Monte
Carlo tree search.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN the face of ever-increasing and diversified demands ofuser requests for network services (NSs), network function
virtualization (NFV) techniques are the key to enable flexible
and efficient service delivery [1]. Instead of deploying each NS
on dedicated hardwares, NFV systems virtualize each type of
network function as multiple instances on different commodity
servers, then chain the instances of different virtual network
functions (VNFs) in a specified order at runtime to carry out
particular NS, a.k.a. service chain composition [2].
We show an example in Figure 1 to illustrate the service
chain composition in detail. The NFV system provides three
types of VNFs: firewall (FW), deep packet inspection (DPI),
and load balancer (LB). Their instances are distributed on three
servers {m1,m2,m3}. Meanwhile, there are two users commu-
nicating with the system through gateway routers {r1, r2, r3}.
User A subscribes the NS of service chain FW → DPI, while
the service chain of user B is LB → DPI. Taking user B as
an example, we see that it has four possible service chain
composition choices, because there are two LB instances and
two DPI instances in the system. In Figure 1, it chooses
LB Instance 1 and DPI Instance 2. The red arrows represent
the corresponding path of its traffic. Different composition
choices may incur different request latencies and different
levels of network congestion. Intuitively, for user B, choosing
LB Instance 1 and DPI Instance 1 may be a better choice. The
reasons include 1) compared with data transmission between
two servers (m1 and m3), data transmission within a single
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Fig. 1. An example of service chain composition.
server (m1) will result in a shorter latency; and 2) compared
with resource contention on DPI Instance 2, monopolizing DPI
Instance 1 will result in a lower congestion.
To date, it still remains an NP-hard problem to conduct ef-
fective service chain composition in NFV systems with various
NSs to achieve ultra-low request latencies and minimum net-
work congestion [9]. Moreover, in practice, connections from
users to NFV systems may become unexpectedly unavailable
[10], and VNF instances may also crash at runtime [11]. Such
issues make the problem even more complicated. In this paper,
we consider the problem of service chain composition in NFV
systems with both user and VNF instance failures from a
game-theoretic perspective. We summarize our key results and
contributions as follows.
Modeling and Formulation: We formulate the service
chain composition problem with both user and VNF instance
failures as a non-cooperative game among users, aiming to
reduce request latencies and mitigate network congestion.
Further more, we show that the formulated game is a weighted
potential game; i.e., any unilateral local improvement made
by an individual user will lead to a global improvement in
the overall system performance. Such a property makes it
attainable to achieve the optimal service chain composition so-
lution in a fully distributed manner. To the best of knowledge,
this paper is the first to study the service chain composition
problem with both user and VNF instance failures from the
game-theoretic perspective.
Scheme Design and Performance Analysis: With such a
formulation, we adopt Markov approximation techniques [12]
and propose an effective distributed scheme called MA-SCCA
(Markov Approximation based Service Chain Composition Al-
gorithm). MA-SCCA achieves provably near-optimal request
latencies and network congestion through interactions among
users. To further accelerate the decision making process, we
adopt Metropolis-Hastings methods [13] and propose MH-
SCCA (Metropolis-Hastings based Service Chain Composition
Algorithm), a variant of MA-SCCA which achieves compara-
ble performance with a lower complexity.
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2TABLE I
COMPARISONS BETWEEN EXISTING SOLUTIONS AND OUR PROPOSED SCHEMES
Optimization Based Game Theory Based Learning Based
[3] [4] [5] [6] MA-SCCA MH-SCCA [7] [8] DRL-SCCA MCTS-SCCA
Performance Guarantee - X X X X X - - - -
Distributed Implementation - X X - X X - - - -
Non-cooperative Users - - X - X X - - X X
Failure Awareness - - - - X X - - X X
Decision-making Overheads∗ M M H H H L M L M L
∗ H, M, and L represent high, medium, and low decision-making overheads, respectively.
Learning-aided Schemes: As comparisons to MA-SCCA
and MH-SCCA, we propose two learning-aided service
chain composition schemes: DRL-SCCA (Deep Reinforce-
ment Learning based Service Chain Composition Algorithm)
and MCTS-SCCA (Monte Carlo Tree Search based Service
Chain Composition Algorithm). To our best knowledge, we
are the first to adopt deep reinforcement learning (DRL) [14]
and Monte Carlo tree search (MCTS) [15] techniques to search
for the optimal Nash equilibrium, respectively.
Experimental Verification and Analysis: We conduct
extensive simulations to evaluate the performance of our
proposed schemes. The results validate their effectiveness, as
well as the adaptivity of MA-SCCA and MH-SCCA when
faced with user and VNF instance failures.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss
related works in Section II. Then, in Section III we present
our model and problem formulation, followed by the proof of
its game property. Section IV elaborates the design of MA-
SCCA and MH-SCCA with their corresponding performance
analysis. Next, Section V shows the detailed designs of DRL-
SCCA and MCTS-SCCA. We evaluate the performance of the
proposed schemes based on numerical simulations in Section
VI and conclude this paper in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORKS
The service chain composition problem is a critical but
challenging resource management problem in the field of NFV.
By far, a great number of works have been conducted [1]. We
compare our proposed schemes with some of the state-of-the-
art solutions in Table I.
A. Optimization Based Approaches
Most of existing works solve the service chain composi-
tion problem from the optimization perspective, focusing on
system energy cost minimization [3, 16] or network utility
maximization [4] for the Telecom Operator. Due to the NP-
hardness of the problem [1], these works often resort to
approximation or heuristic methods to reduce the complexity
of the proposed algorithms. For example, Bari et al. [3]
formulated the problem as an integer linear programming
(ILP) problem, then developed a heuristic method based on
Viterbi algorithm. Wang et al. [4] equated the problem as a
multi-dimension multi-choice knapsack problem, and adopted
Markov approximation [12] techniques to devise a distributed
algorithm. Beck et al. [16] proposed a heuristic algorithm
that coordinates the composition of service chains and their
embeddings into the substrate network.
Though the effectiveness of such works has been well
justified, they do not consider the following aspects.
• They ignore the individualistic behaviors of users. Specif-
ically, they assume that users are cooperative in utility op-
timization for the Telecom Operator. However, in practice,
users are usually non-cooperative, aiming to optimize
their own benefits.
• They require a rich set of prior information including
user locations, service chain requests, and traffic rates.
However, considering privacy issues, some users may be
unwilling to share such information with others.
With all these concerns in mind, in this paper, we model the
service chain composition problem from a game-theoretic per-
spective, and devise distributed schemes that jointly consider
the non-cooperative behaviors and privacy of users.
B. Game Theory Based Approaches
To the best of our knowledge, D’Oro et al. [5] are the
first to study the service chain composition problem from the
game-theoretic perspective. They modeled the problem as a
non-cooperative congestion game and developed a distributed
algorithm which provably converges to a Nash equilibrium
(NE) through interactions among users. Such a design pre-
serves the privacy of users. Following the work in [5], Le
et al. [6] proposed a centralized algorithm that achieves the
best NE with the optimal system performance. However, their
solution is essentially based on the brute-force search, with a
high computational complexity. Chiang et al. [17] modeled the
problem as an exact potential game by regrading each server
as a player. The game eventually ends up with an NE, since
every finite exact potential game possesses an NE [18].
Inspired by all these works, this paper also takes a game-
theoretic perspective. However, our work differs from theirs
in the following aspects. First, we take the user and VNF
instance failures into account. By exploiting the unique prob-
lem structure, we formulate the problem as a non-cooperative
potential game, with the aim to find the optimal NE. Our
proposed schemes, namely MA-SCCA and MH-SCCA, are
both distributed and privacy-preserving. Moreover, they can
adapt to failures in a timely manner.
C. Learning Based Approaches
In addition, some works leveraged recently prevailing learn-
ing techniques such as deep reinforcement learning (DRL)
[14] and Monte Carlo tree search (MCTS) [15] to solve the
service chain composition problem. For instance, Xiao et al.
[7] proposed NFVDeep, a DRL-based approach that deploys
service chains with different QoS requirements and adopts
serialization-and-backtracking methods to shrink the action
space size. Khezri et al. [19] designed a DQN-based agent
that arranges service chains to maximize the admission ratio
and minimize the placement cost. In the meanwhile, Soualah et
al. [8] adopted Monte Carlo tree search methods and proposed
a link failure recovery algorithm. Their solution focuses on
selecting and re-mapping reliable paths for network services
so as to minimize the negative effects of link failures.
3Inspired by all these works, in this paper we propose two
centralized schemes, namely DRL-SCCA and MCTS-SCCA,
that solve the service chain composition problem based on
DRL and MCTS methods, respectively. Unlike the above
works, our proposed schemes focus on searching for the
best Nash equilibrium state. Under such a state, the system
performance is optimal, i.e., with ultra-low request latencies
and minimum network congestion.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we first introduce our system model. Then
we present the game-theoretic formulation of the problem.
By exploiting the problem structure, we further analyze the
property of the game.
A. System Model
We consider an NFV system owned by a Telecom Operator
that provides network services to users. Table II summarizes
the key notations in this paper, including the values of nota-
tions in Figure 1.
Deployment Model: The system provides a set F of
available types of VNFs, with F , |F |. Inside the system,
there is a server cluster M, with M , |M|. Each server
m ∈ M holds a set of VNF instances Fm.1 Each VNF instance
is deployed on a standalone virtual machine (VM).2 We use
V , ⋃m∈M Fm to denote the set of all VNF instances (VMs)
in the system. Besides servers, the system also includes a set
of gateway routers R which manage the communication with
external networks. For any two nodes u1, u2 ∈ R ∪V, we use
l(u1,u2) to denote the latency between them.
Users and Network Services: Outside the system, there
is a group of users, denoted by a set N . The total number
of users is N , |N |. Each user i ∈ N subscribes a specific
network service (NS) Fi , denoted by an ordered VNF chain
{ fi,1, fi,2, · · · , fi,Fi } of length Fi , |Fi |. At runtime, user i
generates traffic with a rate of λi . The traffic first flows into the
system through an ingress router r (in)i ∈R, then flows through
VNF instances of fi, j for j= {1, 2, · · · , Fi}, and finally leaves
the system from an egress router r (out)i ∈R.
Service Chain Composition Decisions: We denote wi as
the service chain composition decision made by user i. The
equality wi, j = v indicates that user i chooses VM v to execute
its j-th VNF. By denoting w−i as the decisions of all users
other than i, we can write w , (wi,w−i) as the combination
of all users’ decisions.
Failures: In practice, users may be unavailable due to
various reasons [10]. Likewise, VMs may break down un-
expectedly at runtime [11]. In this paper, we consider the
simplest case in which such failures are independently and
identically distributed.3 Specifically, we assume that all users
have identical survival and failure probabilities of γ(user) and
γ¯(user), respectively; and that all VMs have identical survival
and failure probabilities of γ(VM) and γ¯(VM), respectively.
1We assume that a server has at most one instance for each VNF type.
However, our model can be directly extended to the case where a server has
multiple instances for some types of VNFs.
2In the rest of this paper, we use the terms VNF instance and VM
interchangeably.
3Our model can serve as a basis to handle more general scenarios with
non-uniform and dependent failures.
TABLE II
KEY NOTATIONS
Notations Descriptions and Examples
F Set of VNF types, F = {FW,LB,DPI}
F Number of VNF types, F = 3
M Set of servers, M = {m1,m2,m3}
M Number of servers, M = 3
Fm Set of VNF instances provided by server mFm1 = {LB Instance 1,DPI Instance 1}
V Set of all VNF instances (VMs)V = {FW Instance 1, · · · ,DPI Instance 2}
R Set of gateway routers, R = {r1, r2, r3}
l(u1,u2)
Latency between node u1 and u2
l(r1,FW Instance 1) = 1msN Set of users, N = {A, B}
N Number of users, N = 2
Fi Network service request of user iFA = {FW,DPI}
fi, j
j-th VNF in user i’s required service chain
fA,1 = FW, fA,2 = DPI
Fi Length of user i’s service chain, FA = 2
λi Traffic rate of user i, λA = 10Mbps
r(in)
i
Ingress router of user i, r(in)
A
= r1
r(out)
i
Egress router of user i, r(out)
A
= r2
γ(user) Survival probability of users, γ(user) = 0.9
γ¯(user) Failure probability of users, γ¯(user) = 0.1
γ(VM) Survival probability of VMs, γ(VM) = 0.9
γ¯(VM) Failure probability of VMs, γ¯(VM) = 0.1
Ωi Failure cost of user i, ΩA = 1000 units
wi
Service chain composition decision of user i
wA = {FW Instance 1,DPI Instance 2}
wi, j
The VM chosen for the j-th VNF of user i
wA,1 = FW Instance 1
B. User Costs
Different service chain composition decisions may result in
different costs. Formally, we define the cost function of user
i as follows.
i) If user i fails, it will receive a large cost (penalty) Ωi .
Such a case happens with probability γ¯(user).
ii) If user i survives, but at least one of its chosen VMs fails,
the corresponding cost is also Ωi . Such a case occurs with
probability γ(user) ·
(
1 − γFi(VM)
)
.
iii) If both user i and all its selected VMs survive, which
occurs with probability γ(user) · γFi(VM), we should consider
both latency and congestion costs.
• Total Latency: Given the decision wi , we define the
total latency experienced by user i as
c(L)i (wi) , l(r (in)i ,wi,1) +
Fi∑
j=2
l(wi, j−1,wi, j ) + l(wi,Fi ,r (out)i ) .
(1)
• Total Congestion: Different users may employ the
same VM. Therefore, we should also take the con-
gestion due to such resource contention into account.
Given the decisions of all users w, we define the set
of users that share VM v as
Nv(w) , {k |k ∈ N, v ∈ wk}. (2)
Next, given that user i survives, we define the work-
4load on VM v ∈ wi as
δi,v(w) , λi +
∑
k∈Nv (w)/{i }
γ(user) · λk . (3)
Then the total congestion experienced by user i is
c(C)i (w) ,
∑
v∈wi
δi,v(w). (4)
Therefore, if both user i and all its selected VMs survive,
the cost experienced by user i is αc(L)i (wi)+ c(C)i (w). The
parameter α is a positive constant that weighs the relative
importance of latency reduction to congestion mitigation.
Combining the costs defined in i), ii), and iii), the expected
cost of user i is given by
ci(w) , γ¯(user) · Ωi + γ(user) ·
(
1 − γFi(VM)
)
· Ωi
+ γ(user) · γFi(VM) ·
[
αc(L)i (wi) + c(C)i (w)
]
.
(5)
C. Game-Theoretic Formulation
In this section, we formulate the service chain composition
problem as a non-cooperative game. Typically, a game consists
of three elements: a set of players, a set of strategies, and cost
(utility) functions.
• Player: We view each user of the NFV system as a player,
and denote N as the set of players.
• Strategy: Each player’s strategy set is denoted by Wi ,
which includes all its possible service chain composition
decisions. We use W , ⋃i∈NWi to denote the joint
strategy space of all players.
• Cost Function: The cost function ci(·) for each player i
is defined in (5).
We then formulate a game G which is characterized by the
triad (N,W, {ci}i∈N). In such a game, each player i aims to
minimize its own cost. Such a cost is not only determined by
its own strategy wi but also other players’ strategies w−i . The
goal of the game is to search for a Nash equilibrium (NE), a
state in which no player has the incentive to change its current
strategy unilaterally. However, when the number of players is
huge, it is in general challenging to find an NE. Furthermore,
there may be more than one equilibrium in the game and each
equilibrium may induce different system performances. For the
Telecom Operator, it is often preferable to achieve the optimal
system performance, which adds even more complexities to
the design of the service chain composition schemes. In the
following, we exploit the unique structure of the problem and
show that the two goals of finding an NE and optimizing the
system performance can actually be unified.
We first show that the game G is a weighted potential game.
In such a game, the local performance improvement in terms of
cost reduction by any individual player i is proportional to the
global performance improvement of the system. Specifically,
we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The game G is a weighted potential game with
potential function
Φ(w) , 2αγ(user)
∑
k∈N
λkc
(L)
k
(wk) +
∑
v∈V
( ∑
k∈Nv (w)
λkγ(user)
)2
,
(6)
such that for any pair of states w = (wi,w−i) and w′ =
(w′i,w−i) that involves only player i’s strategy change,
Φ(w) − Φ(w′) = 2λiγ−Fi(VM) (ci(w) − ci(w′)) . (7)
The proof is relegated to Appendix-A. For the potential
function defined in (6), its first term is the summation of
the product of each player’s traffic rate and the latency it
experiences. Such a term actually represents the overall traffic
load in the system. The second term is the square-sum of
the expected workloads of all VMs. Such a term reflects the
congestion status of the system. Therefore, we can view the
weighted sum of the overall traffic load and congestion load,
i.e. the potential function Φ(·), as one measurement of the
overall system performance. The Telecom Operator aims to
optimize the system performance, i.e., minimize the potential
value. Each individual player aims to improve its own benefits,
i.e., minimize its cost. In the following, we show that in such
a weighted potential game, the two goals actually coincide.
Formally, the Telecom Operator tries to solve the following
optimization problem:
Minimize
w
Φ(w)
Subject to w ∈ W. (8)
We denote w∗ as the optimal solution to problem (8). Then,
we show that w∗ is also an NE of game G. Let’s consider the
scenario where the current service chain composition decision
is w∗ = (w∗1, · · · ,w∗N ) and player i plans to change its strategy
from w∗i to wi . Since w∗ is the optimal solution to problem
(8), we have
Φ(wi,w∗−i) − Φ(w∗i ,w∗−i) ≥ 0. (9)
Combining (9) and Theorem 1, we obtain
ci(wi,w∗−i) − ci(w∗i ,w∗−i) ≥ 0. (10)
Inequality (10) holds for any wi ∈ Wi , indicating that player
i can not attain any benefits (cost reduction) by changing its
strategy from w∗i to any other. Therefore, w∗ is an NE.
In the rest of this paper, we refer to the optimal solution w∗
as the optimal NE of game G. Under such a state, the system
performance is optimized and no player has the incentive to
change its strategy unilaterally, which simultaneously satisfies
the goals of the Telecom Operator and all players.
IV. SCHEME DESIGN
Essentially, problem (8) is a combinatorial problem with its
search space size exponential in the number of VNF types
and the number of players. Such a problem is in general NP-
hard to be solved [9]. For practical NFV systems, it is often
desirable to develop easy-to-implement solutions that solve
the problem approximately with performance guarantees. With
such a mentality, we adopt Markov approximation framework
[12] to solve the service chain composition problem, leading
to distributed solutions which approximate the optimal Nash
equilibrium (NE) through interactions of players. In the fol-
lowing subsections, we first transform problem (8) into an
approximation form. Then we develop an effective distributed
scheme called MA-SCCA (Markov Approximation based Ser-
vice Chain Composition Algorithm), as well as its variant
called MH-SCCA (Metropolis-Hastings based Service Chain
Composition Algorithm). Finally, we conduct performance
analysis for the two proposed schemes.
5A. Problem Transformation
First, we note that problem (8) is actually equivalent to the
following problem with the same optimal value:
Minimize
pi0
∑
w∈W
piwΦ(w)
Subject to
∑
w∈W
piw = 1,
(11)
where variable pi is a non-negative vector of length |W|. In
fact, problem (11) can be viewed as the optimization problem
to decide the time fraction piw that the system spends on
each state w, so as to minimize the time-average of potential
value Φ over a period of time. Therefore, the optimal value of
problem (11) is achieved only when the system spends all the
time on the state w∗ with minimum potential value, namely
the desired optimal state.
Next, by applying log-sum-exponential approximation [12],
we approximate problem (11) as follows
Minimize
pi0
∑
w∈W
piwΦ(w) + 1
β
∑
w∈W
piw log piw
Subject to
∑
w∈W
piw = 1,
(12)
where β is a positive constant that regulates the approximation
gap, as elaborated by the following theorem.
Theorem 2: The optimality gap induced by the log-sum-
exponential approximation is upper-bounded by 1βFN log M .
We relegate the proof to Appendix-B. Theorem 2 implies
that the approximation gap can be reduced by increasing the
value of β. By solving the KKT conditions of problem (12),
we obtain the optimal solution as
pi∗w =
exp[−βΦ(w)]∑
w¯∈W exp[−βΦ(w¯)]
, ∀w ∈ W. (13)
Then the NFV system can proceed by spending a fraction pi∗w
of time on each state w to solve problem (8) approximately.
However, in practice, the size of the search spaceW is usually
rather huge, making the calculation of (13) computationally
intractable. Instead of direct calculation, we switch to design-
ing a discrete-time Markov chain and adopt random sampling
techniques to obtain pi∗w in an asymptotic fashion [12].
B. Markov Chain Design
We construct a discrete-time Markov chain with its state
space as W. In general, we have two degrees of freedom to
design such a Markov chain: its topology and the transition
probabilities among states.
1) Topology: For a Markov chain, its topology is defined
as a graph in which each vertex denotes a particular state and
each edge implies the mutual accessibility between its two
associated states by one-step transition.
For topology of the designed Markov chain, we only con-
sider two types of edges (transitions). The first one is self-loop,
i.e., for each state w, the transition to itself is allowed. The
other is the transition between any pair of states that differs
in exactly one player’s strategy change. Formally, given any
two states w and w′, they are connected in the topology if
and only if their Hamming distance Hw,w′ ≤ 1. The Hamming
distance is defined as follows:
Hw,w′ ,
∑
i∈N
Iwi,w′i , (14)
in which IA is the indicator function for the occurrence of event
A. Specifically, IA = 1 if event A occurs and zero otherwise.
2) Transition Probability: On one hand, for each state w,
the probability of its self-transition is defined as
pw,w ,
1
N
∑
i∈N
exp[−βΦ(w)]∑
w¯∈Ai exp[−βΦ(w¯)]
. (15)
Note that Ai is a subset of the state space that only player i’s
strategy varies and other players’ strategies remain unchanged.
Formally, we have Ai , {(w¯i,w−i) | w¯i ∈ Wi}.
On the other hand, for any pair of states w and w′ that
differs in player i’s strategy, the transition probability from
state w to state w′ is defined as
pw,w′ ,
1
N
exp[−βΦ(w′)]∑
w¯∈Ai exp[−βΦ(w¯)]
. (16)
The transition probabilities are zero for other pairs of states.
The designed Markov chain enjoys some properties that
facilitate our subsequent scheme designs, as shown by the
following theorem.
Theorem 3: The designed Markov chain is time-reversible
with its stationary distribution identical to (13).
The proof is relegated to Appendix-C.
C. Scheme Design
We implement the Markov chain that proceeds over itera-
tions. In each iteration, given current state w, each player i
is equally likely to be selected to update its strategy. Once
chosen, player i would change its strategy unilaterally from
wi to w′i with probability 4
p(i)(wi,w−i ),(w′i,w−i )
,
exp[−βΦ(w′i,w−i)]∑
w¯i ∈Wi exp[−βΦ(w¯i,w−i)]
. (17)
For such a general procedure, two questions remain unsolved.
The first is regarding the player selection in each iteration.
Clearly, the selection can be implemented in a centralized
manner by employing a dedicated server to maintain all
players. Once selected, the only player will get notified and
authorized the chance to change its strategy. Such a centralized
implementation requires global information such as the num-
ber of players, which may change over time due to network
dynamics. Moreover, the dedicated server may be a single
point of failure. With all these concerns in mind, how can
we implement the player selection in a distributed fashion?
The second is regarding the state transition in each iteration.
Note that according to (6), the calculation of the potential
value Φ in (17) requires all players’ information, including
their strategies and traffic rates. Of course, we can employ a
dedicated server to conduct this calculation. However, such an
implementation can cause privacy issues, since some players
may be unwilling to reveal their personal information. More-
over, the dedicated server may be a single point of failure.
Then, is it possible to calculate the transition probability (17)
by the player itself using only local information?
In response to the above two questions, we show the detailed
design of player selection and state transition as follows.
Distributed Player Selection: To conduct the player selec-
tion procedure in a distributed fashion, we equip each player
with a Poisson countdown clock of rate µ. At the beginning
of each iteration, each player will set up a countdown timer
independently with the time length randomly generated from
4Note that w′i may be identical to wi , which corresponds to a self-transition.
6an exponential distribution of mean 1/µ. The player whose
timer first expires would acquire the chance to change its
strategy. Meanwhile, it will notify other players to abort their
timers. For such a procedure, we have the following remarks:
 The above procedure ensures that, in every iteration,
each player has an equal probability to be selected.
Furthermore, exactly one of them will be selected.
 Besides, such an implementation enjoys a good adap-
tivity. Specifically, the countdown-clock setup requires
no knowledge of the number of players nor information
update upon the joining or leaving of players.
 In practice, by setting µ  1, the countdown (player
selection) procedure will take up only a small time
fraction of each iteration.
Transition with Local Information: To calculate the tran-
sition probability using only local information, we take a
transformation as follows. According to (7), for the chosen
player i, we have
p(i)(wi,w−i ),(w′i,w−i )
=
exp[−βΦ(w′i,w−i)]∑
w¯i ∈Wi exp[−βΦ(w¯i,w−i)]
=
1∑
w¯i ∈Wi exp{β[Φ(w′i,w−i) − Φ(w¯i,w−i)]}
=
exp[−2βλiγ−Fi(VM)ci(w′i,w−i)]∑
w¯i ∈Wi exp[−2βλiγ−Fi(VM)ci(w¯i,w−i)]
.
(18)
Unlike (17), the transition probability (18) depends only on
the local information of player i such as its traffic rate λi , its
service chain length Fi , and its cost ci .
Based on the above design, we propose MA-SCCA (Markov
Approximation based Service Chain Composition Algorithm)
that solves problem (12), thereby solving problem (8) in an
approximate fashion. The pseudocode of MA-SCCA is shown
in Algorithm 1. Initially, each player picks a strategy randomly
from its strategy space and runs Algorithm 1. Note that, for
line 2 in Algorithm 1, the RESET signal is sent from the
Telecom Operator at the beginning of each iteration.
Remarks: MA-SCCA runs in a fully distributed manner
with decision making by individual players with their local
information. The only necessary message passing in each iter-
ation includes the RESET signal from the Telecom Operator
and the SUSPEND signal from the chosen player. Besides,
Algorithm 1 Markov Approximation based Service Chain
Composition Algorithm (MA-SCCA) in one iteration for each
player i
1: Repeat do
2: if player i receives signal RESET then
3: Reset its clock with rate µ.
4: Start the countdown.
5: end if
6: if player i receives signal SUSPEND then
7: Suspend its clock.
8: end if
9: if player i’s clock expires then
10: Send signal SUSPEND to other players.
11: Apply strategy w′i chosen from its strategy setWi with
probability p(i)(wi,w−i ),(w′i,w−i )
defined in (18).
12: end if
according to Theorem 2, we can reduce the approximation
gap by increasing the value of β in (18). However, this will
also lead to a longer convergence time [12]. In practice, the
parameter β should be well-tuned to achieve both good system
performance and fast convergence rate.
D. Variant of MA-SCCA
In each iteration, the chosen player i should calculate the
transition probability (18) for each strategy in its strategy
space. To complete this computation, player i should report
all its possible strategies w¯i ∈ Wi to the Telecom Opera-
tor, and download the corresponding costs ci(w¯i,w−i) from
the Telecom Operator. Such a procedure leads to high data
transmission overheads. To mitigate such overheads, we adopt
Metropolis-Hastings techniques [13], and propose a variant
of MA-SCCA called MH-SCCA (Metropolis-Hastings based
Service Chain Composition Algorithm).
The core component of the Metropolis-Hastings design is a
Markov chain, which is known as the proposal chain. With the
proposal chain, the general procedure proceeds as follows. In
each iteration, the proposal chain will propose a state transition
from the current state according to its transition probabilities.
Such a proposal would be accepted with some certain probabil-
ity, a.k.a. acceptance probability. If the proposal is accepted,
the state transition succeeds. Otherwise, the Markov chain will
stay on the original state. By a proper design of the transition
and acceptance probabilities, we can acquire a Markov chain
with the desired stationary distribution (13). For MH-SCCA,
its proposal chain has the same topology as the Markov chain
of MA-SCCA. In the following, we first show how MH-SCCA
proceeds in general and then the design of its transition and
acceptance probabilities.
General Procedure of MH-SCCA: In each iteration, given
the current state w, a player is selected uniformly randomly
(following the same way in MA-SCCA) to update its strategy.
The chosen player i will pick a strategy w′i uniformly randomly
from its strategy set,5 resulting in a state transition proposal
from w = (wi,w−i) to w′ = (w′i,w−i). Such a proposal will be
accepted with probability aw,w′ , defined as
aw,w′ = min
(
exp(−βΦ(w′))
exp(−βΦ(w)) , 1
)
. (19)
Upon acceptance, the player will change its strategy accord-
ingly. Otherwise, it sticks to its previous strategy.
Different from MA-SCCA, the transition probabilities of the
proposal chain of MH-SCCA are as follows. Given a state w,
a self-transition occurs in the proposal chain only when the
chosen player picks its original strategy again, with probability
qw,w ,
1
N
∑
i∈N
1
|Wi | . (20)
Meanwhile, for any pair of states w and w′ that differs in only
player i’s strategy, the transition probability is
qw,w′ ,
1
N
· 1|Wi | . (21)
The transition probabilities of other state pairs are all zero. In
order to ensure the validity of the proposal chain, we show
5The picked strategy may be identical to the player’s current strategy, which
corresponds to a self-transition.
7that, all the transition probabilities out from a given state w
sum to one:∑
w′∈W
qw,w′ = qw,w +
∑
w′∈W
Hw,w′=1
qw,w′
=
1
N
∑
i∈N
1
|Wi | +
∑
i∈N
(|Wi | − 1) · 1N ·
1
|Wi |
=
∑
i∈N
1
N
· 1|Wi | · |Wi | = 1.
(22)
Next, we show that the Markov chain induced by the state
proposal and acceptance procedures has the same stationary
distribution as (13). We prove this by verifying that the detailed
balance equations are satisfied for any two states w and w′
with Hamming distance Hw,w′ = 1. Specifically,
pi∗w · qw,w′ · aw,w′
=
exp[−βΦ(w)]∑
w¯∈W exp[−βΦ(w¯)]
· 1
N |Wi | ·min
(
exp(−βΦ(w′))
exp(−βΦ(w)) , 1
)
=C ·min (exp[−βΦ(w′)], exp[−βΦ(w)])
=
exp[−βΦ(w′)]∑
w¯∈W exp[−βΦ(w¯)]
· 1
N |Wi | ·min
(
exp(−βΦ(w))
exp(−βΦ(w′)), 1
)
=pi∗w′ · qw′,w · aw′,w,
(23)
where C , (N |Wi | ·∑w¯∈W exp[−βΦ(w¯)])−1 is a constant.
Similar to the design of MA-SCCA, we can reformulate the
acceptance probability so that it uses only local information.
Formally, by applying (7), we have
a(wi,w−i ),(w′i,w−i ) = min
(
exp(−2βλiγ−Fi(VM)ci(w′i,w−i))
exp(−2βλiγ−Fi(VM)ci(wi,w−i))
, 1
)
.
(24)
Remarks: The pseudocode of MH-SCCA differs with MA-
SCCA only in line 11 of Algorithm 1. Instead of taking a
strategy according to the probability distribution (18), under
MH-SCCA, player i randomly uniformly picks a strategy
and accepts it with probability (24). Such a minor change
significantly reduces the overall computational complexity.
The reason is that, in each iteration, MA-SCCA requires the
costs of all states that the chosen player i can reach by
changing its own strategy, while MH-SCCA requires only the
cost of the current state and the proposal state. As a result,
such improvements would lead to a faster convergence rate in
practice, which is verified by simulations in Section VI.
E. Performance Analysis
We denote pit as the probability distribution over all states in
W at the t-th iteration. We adopt the total variation distance
[20] as the metric to characterize the difference between pit
and the desired distribution pi∗. Formally, the total variance
distance between pit and pi∗ is given by
‖pit − pi∗‖TV , 12
∑
w∈W
|pitw − pi∗w |. (25)
Then we define the mixing time (convergence time) of the
Markov chain as follows
tmix(ε) , min{t ≥ 0 : ‖pit − pi∗‖TV ≤ ε}, (26)
which measures the minimum number of iterations required
to bound the total variation distance within a small value ε.
Regarding MA-SCCA and MH-SCCA, we have the following
theorem on their mixing times.
Theorem 4: The mixing times of MA-SCCA and MH-SCCA
are upper-bounded as follows
tmix(ε) ≤
⌈
log 12ε +
1
2FN log M +
1
2 βD
− log (1 − 12M2F (N+1) exp [−4βD])
⌉
, (27)
where D is the difference between the maximum and minimum
potential values and defined as
D , max
w∈W
Φ(w) − min
w∈W
Φ(w). (28)
The proof is relegated to Appendix-D.
Theorem 4 shows that the upper bound of the mixing
time increases proportionally to the number of players N ,
the number of servers M , and the number of VNF types F.
Moreover, we also find that increasing the value of β will not
only reduce the approximation gap (see Theorem 2), but also
prolong the mixing time. In practice, it is important to make
a trade-off between optimality and convergence based on the
system design objective. Note that, although MH-SCCA and
MA-SCCA are shown to have the same upper bound of mixing
times, MH-SCCA often converges faster than MA-SCCA in
practice. We will further verify this in Section VI.
V. LEARNING-AIDED SCHEME DESIGN
As comparisons to MA-SCCA and MH-SCCA, in this
section, we propose two novel learning-aided service chain
composition schemes. The two scheme designs are based on
deep reinforcement learning (DRL) methods and Monte Carlo
tree search (MCTS) methods, respectively.
A. DRL-based Service Chain Composition
In this subsection, we first review some basics of DRL, then
show the design of our DRL-based Service Chain Composition
Algorithm (DRL-SCCA), as visualized in Figure 2.
Over the past few years, deep reinforcement learning (DRL)
techniques have been widely adopted in various fields to
solve complicated decision making problems and achieved
encouraging results [21] [22]. Under a typical DRL setting,
there is an agent continuously interacting with its environment
over iterations. At the beginning of each iteration t, the
agent observes the environment state st . Meanwhile, the agent
maintains a policy pi that decides the action at based on
the observed state st . Depending on the agent’s action, the
environment evolves to the next state st+1 and reveals a reward
signal rt to the agent. The agent then exploits such information
to improve its policy. In DRL, the policy is usually imple-
mented as a deep neural network (DNN) with parameters θ.
The long-term goal of the agent is to maximize the expectation
of its cumulative rewards, denoted by E[∑∞t=0 γtrt ], where the
constant γ ∈ [0, 1] is a discounting factor that weighs the
impact of future rewards.
To apply DRL to solve service chain composition problem,
the key lies in how we cast service chain composition into a
decision making process. Following the similar idea in MA-
SCCA and MH-SCCA, we consider the service chain compo-
sition as an iterative process. Given a randomly initialized state
w, the agent conducts a series of iterations to update strategies
for players. In each iteration, the agent only picks one player
to update its strategy. Accordingly, the agent will receive a
reward that indicates the benefit resulting from such update.
Through such a series of updates, the agent aims to achieve
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(i,w0i)
<latexit sha1_base64="sLdTjfuC22OKHu7 +QX1fqyTFWSs=">AAAC13icjVHJSsRAEH3GbdyjHr0EB1FBhkQG9Ch48ajguKAydNqemcZsd DouDIM38eoPeNU/Ev9A/8LqNoILoh2SvH5V73VXVZhFMte+/9zn9A8MDg1XRkbHxicmp9zpmb 08LRQXDZ5GqToIWS4imYiGljoSB5kSLA4jsR+ebZr4/rlQuUyTXX2ViZOYtRPZkpxpopruzJJ c8Y5jpjthq3vRa8rF5aZb9Wu+Xd5PEJSginJtp+4TjnGKFBwFYggk0IQjMOT0HCGAj4y4E3S JU4SkjQv0MEragrIEZTBiz+jbpt1RySa0N565VXM6JaJXkdLDAmlSylOEzWmejRfW2bC/eXet p7nbFf3D0ismVqND7F+6j8z/6kwtGi2s2xok1ZRZxlTHS5fCdsXc3PtUlSaHjDiDTymuCHOr/ OizZzW5rd30ltn4i800rNnzMrfAq7klDTj4Ps6fYG+1Fvi1YKde3aiXo65gDvNYonmuYQNb2 EaDvC9xjwc8OofOtXPj3L6nOn2lZhZflnP3BknzlgQ=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="sLdTjfuC22OKHu7 +QX1fqyTFWSs=">AAAC13icjVHJSsRAEH3GbdyjHr0EB1FBhkQG9Ch48ajguKAydNqemcZsd DouDIM38eoPeNU/Ev9A/8LqNoILoh2SvH5V73VXVZhFMte+/9zn9A8MDg1XRkbHxicmp9zpmb 08LRQXDZ5GqToIWS4imYiGljoSB5kSLA4jsR+ebZr4/rlQuUyTXX2ViZOYtRPZkpxpopruzJJ c8Y5jpjthq3vRa8rF5aZb9Wu+Xd5PEJSginJtp+4TjnGKFBwFYggk0IQjMOT0HCGAj4y4E3S JU4SkjQv0MEragrIEZTBiz+jbpt1RySa0N565VXM6JaJXkdLDAmlSylOEzWmejRfW2bC/eXet p7nbFf3D0ismVqND7F+6j8z/6kwtGi2s2xok1ZRZxlTHS5fCdsXc3PtUlSaHjDiDTymuCHOr/ OizZzW5rd30ltn4i800rNnzMrfAq7klDTj4Ps6fYG+1Fvi1YKde3aiXo65gDvNYonmuYQNb2 EaDvC9xjwc8OofOtXPj3L6nOn2lZhZflnP3BknzlgQ=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="sLdTjfuC22OKHu7 +QX1fqyTFWSs=">AAAC13icjVHJSsRAEH3GbdyjHr0EB1FBhkQG9Ch48ajguKAydNqemcZsd DouDIM38eoPeNU/Ev9A/8LqNoILoh2SvH5V73VXVZhFMte+/9zn9A8MDg1XRkbHxicmp9zpmb 08LRQXDZ5GqToIWS4imYiGljoSB5kSLA4jsR+ebZr4/rlQuUyTXX2ViZOYtRPZkpxpopruzJJ c8Y5jpjthq3vRa8rF5aZb9Wu+Xd5PEJSginJtp+4TjnGKFBwFYggk0IQjMOT0HCGAj4y4E3S JU4SkjQv0MEragrIEZTBiz+jbpt1RySa0N565VXM6JaJXkdLDAmlSylOEzWmejRfW2bC/eXet p7nbFf3D0ismVqND7F+6j8z/6kwtGi2s2xok1ZRZxlTHS5fCdsXc3PtUlSaHjDiDTymuCHOr/ OizZzW5rd30ltn4i800rNnzMrfAq7klDTj4Ps6fYG+1Fvi1YKde3aiXo65gDvNYonmuYQNb2 EaDvC9xjwc8OofOtXPj3L6nOn2lZhZflnP3BknzlgQ=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="G30nvnJkyKBlKcC ymNnrqTxJgV4=">AAACtXicjVLLSgMxFD0dX7VWrWs3g0VwVTJudCnowmUF+4BaZCZNa+y8T DJCKf6AWz9O/AP9C2/iCGoRzTAzJ+fec5KbmyiPpTaMvVS8peWV1bXqem2jXtvc2m7UuzorFB cdnsWZ6kehFrFMRcdIE4t+rkSYRLHoRdNTG+/dC6Vlll6aWS6GSThJ5Vjy0BDVvm40WYu54S+ CoARNlCNrPOMKI2TgKJBAIIUhHCOEpmeAAAw5cUPMiVOEpIsLPKBG2oKyBGWExE7pO6HZoGR TmltP7dScVonpVaT0sU+ajPIUYbua7+KFc7bsb95z52n3NqN/VHolxBrcEPuX7jPzvzpbi8EY x64GSTXljrHV8dKlcKdid+5/qcqQQ06cxSOKK8LcKT/P2Xca7Wq3Zxu6+KvLtKyd8zK3wJvdJ fU3+NnNRdA9bAWsFVwwVLGLPRxQG49wgnO00SHLER7x5J15t97dxz3wKuWF2MG34el34YWM3 A==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="eumLQC5BzRoqUSN FAkLCBC+lel8=">AAACzHicjVLLSsNAFD2Nr1qrxm7dBItYQUriRpeCG5cV7ENsKUk6bYfmR TJRSynuxK9wq38k/oH+hXfGFNQiOiHJmXPvOTN37jiRxxNhmq85bWFxaXklv1pYK65vbOpbxU YSprHL6m7ohXHLsRPm8YDVBRcea0Uxs33HY01ndCrjzWsWJzwMLsQ4Yh3fHgS8z11bENXVSxV +YLR9Wwyd/uRm2uV7+129bFZNNYx5YGWgjGzUQv0FbfQQwkUKHwwBBGEPNhJ6rmDBRERcBxP iYkJcxRmmKJA2pSxGGTaxI/oOaHaVsQHNpWei1C6t4tEbk9LALmlCyosJy9UMFU+Vs2R/854o T7m3Mf2dzMsnVmBI7F+6WeZ/dbIWgT6OVQ2caooUI6tzM5dUnYrcufGlKkEOEXES9ygeE3aVc nbOhtIkqnZ5traKv6lMycq5m+WmeJe7pAZbP9s5DxqHVcusWucm8tjGDirUxiOc4Aw11MnyF o94wrN2qd1p959XQctld6KEb0N7+ADRk5TP</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="eumLQC5BzRoqUSN FAkLCBC+lel8=">AAACzHicjVLLSsNAFD2Nr1qrxm7dBItYQUriRpeCG5cV7ENsKUk6bYfmR TJRSynuxK9wq38k/oH+hXfGFNQiOiHJmXPvOTN37jiRxxNhmq85bWFxaXklv1pYK65vbOpbxU YSprHL6m7ohXHLsRPm8YDVBRcea0Uxs33HY01ndCrjzWsWJzwMLsQ4Yh3fHgS8z11bENXVSxV +YLR9Wwyd/uRm2uV7+129bFZNNYx5YGWgjGzUQv0FbfQQwkUKHwwBBGEPNhJ6rmDBRERcBxP iYkJcxRmmKJA2pSxGGTaxI/oOaHaVsQHNpWei1C6t4tEbk9LALmlCyosJy9UMFU+Vs2R/854o T7m3Mf2dzMsnVmBI7F+6WeZ/dbIWgT6OVQ2caooUI6tzM5dUnYrcufGlKkEOEXES9ygeE3aVc nbOhtIkqnZ5traKv6lMycq5m+WmeJe7pAZbP9s5DxqHVcusWucm8tjGDirUxiOc4Aw11MnyF o94wrN2qd1p959XQctld6KEb0N7+ADRk5TP</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="ZU5UHOAxdDxtOjH ujZOycFvxec4=">AAAC13icjVHLSsNAFD3GV33HunQTLKKClEQEXQpuXFawVdFSJnHaDs2LZ KKWIu7ErT/gVv9I/AP9C++MI/hAdEKSM+fec2buvX4aily67vOQNTwyOjZempicmp6ZnbPny4 08KbKA14MkTLIjn+U8FDGvSyFDfpRmnEV+yA/93q6KH57zLBdJfCD7KW9GrBOLtgiYJKpll1f FunMaMdn124OLq5ZYWWvZFbfq6uX8BJ4BFZhVS+wnnOIMCQIUiMARQxIOwZDTcwIPLlLimhg QlxESOs5xhUnSFpTFKYMR26Nvh3Ynho1przxzrQ7olJDejJQOlkmTUF5GWJ3m6HihnRX7m/dA e6q79envG6+IWIkusX/pPjL/q1O1SLSxrWsQVFOqGVVdYFwK3RV1c+dTVZIcUuIUPqN4RjjQy o8+O1qT69pVb5mOv+hMxap9YHILvKpb0oC97+P8CRobVc+tevtuZWfTjLqERSxhlea5hR3so YY6eV/iHg94tI6ta+vGun1PtYaMZgFflnX3BkizlgA=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="sLdTjfuC22OKHu7 +QX1fqyTFWSs=">AAAC13icjVHJSsRAEH3GbdyjHr0EB1FBhkQG9Ch48ajguKAydNqemcZsd DouDIM38eoPeNU/Ev9A/8LqNoILoh2SvH5V73VXVZhFMte+/9zn9A8MDg1XRkbHxicmp9zpmb 08LRQXDZ5GqToIWS4imYiGljoSB5kSLA4jsR+ebZr4/rlQuUyTXX2ViZOYtRPZkpxpopruzJJ c8Y5jpjthq3vRa8rF5aZb9Wu+Xd5PEJSginJtp+4TjnGKFBwFYggk0IQjMOT0HCGAj4y4E3S JU4SkjQv0MEragrIEZTBiz+jbpt1RySa0N565VXM6JaJXkdLDAmlSylOEzWmejRfW2bC/eXet p7nbFf3D0ismVqND7F+6j8z/6kwtGi2s2xok1ZRZxlTHS5fCdsXc3PtUlSaHjDiDTymuCHOr/ OizZzW5rd30ltn4i800rNnzMrfAq7klDTj4Ps6fYG+1Fvi1YKde3aiXo65gDvNYonmuYQNb2 EaDvC9xjwc8OofOtXPj3L6nOn2lZhZflnP3BknzlgQ=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="sLdTjfuC22OKHu7 +QX1fqyTFWSs=">AAAC13icjVHJSsRAEH3GbdyjHr0EB1FBhkQG9Ch48ajguKAydNqemcZsd DouDIM38eoPeNU/Ev9A/8LqNoILoh2SvH5V73VXVZhFMte+/9zn9A8MDg1XRkbHxicmp9zpmb 08LRQXDZ5GqToIWS4imYiGljoSB5kSLA4jsR+ebZr4/rlQuUyTXX2ViZOYtRPZkpxpopruzJJ c8Y5jpjthq3vRa8rF5aZb9Wu+Xd5PEJSginJtp+4TjnGKFBwFYggk0IQjMOT0HCGAj4y4E3S JU4SkjQv0MEragrIEZTBiz+jbpt1RySa0N565VXM6JaJXkdLDAmlSylOEzWmejRfW2bC/eXet p7nbFf3D0ismVqND7F+6j8z/6kwtGi2s2xok1ZRZxlTHS5fCdsXc3PtUlSaHjDiDTymuCHOr/ OizZzW5rd30ltn4i800rNnzMrfAq7klDTj4Ps6fYG+1Fvi1YKde3aiXo65gDvNYonmuYQNb2 EaDvC9xjwc8OofOtXPj3L6nOn2lZhZflnP3BknzlgQ=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="sLdTjfuC22OKHu7 +QX1fqyTFWSs=">AAAC13icjVHJSsRAEH3GbdyjHr0EB1FBhkQG9Ch48ajguKAydNqemcZsd DouDIM38eoPeNU/Ev9A/8LqNoILoh2SvH5V73VXVZhFMte+/9zn9A8MDg1XRkbHxicmp9zpmb 08LRQXDZ5GqToIWS4imYiGljoSB5kSLA4jsR+ebZr4/rlQuUyTXX2ViZOYtRPZkpxpopruzJJ c8Y5jpjthq3vRa8rF5aZb9Wu+Xd5PEJSginJtp+4TjnGKFBwFYggk0IQjMOT0HCGAj4y4E3S JU4SkjQv0MEragrIEZTBiz+jbpt1RySa0N565VXM6JaJXkdLDAmlSylOEzWmejRfW2bC/eXet p7nbFf3D0ismVqND7F+6j8z/6kwtGi2s2xok1ZRZxlTHS5fCdsXc3PtUlSaHjDiDTymuCHOr/ OizZzW5rd30ltn4i800rNnzMrfAq7klDTj4Ps6fYG+1Fvi1YKde3aiXo65gDvNYonmuYQNb2 EaDvC9xjwc8OofOtXPj3L6nOn2lZhZflnP3BknzlgQ=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="sLdTjfuC22OKHu7 +QX1fqyTFWSs=">AAAC13icjVHJSsRAEH3GbdyjHr0EB1FBhkQG9Ch48ajguKAydNqemcZsd DouDIM38eoPeNU/Ev9A/8LqNoILoh2SvH5V73VXVZhFMte+/9zn9A8MDg1XRkbHxicmp9zpmb 08LRQXDZ5GqToIWS4imYiGljoSB5kSLA4jsR+ebZr4/rlQuUyTXX2ViZOYtRPZkpxpopruzJJ c8Y5jpjthq3vRa8rF5aZb9Wu+Xd5PEJSginJtp+4TjnGKFBwFYggk0IQjMOT0HCGAj4y4E3S JU4SkjQv0MEragrIEZTBiz+jbpt1RySa0N565VXM6JaJXkdLDAmlSylOEzWmejRfW2bC/eXet p7nbFf3D0ismVqND7F+6j8z/6kwtGi2s2xok1ZRZxlTHS5fCdsXc3PtUlSaHjDiDTymuCHOr/ OizZzW5rd30ltn4i800rNnzMrfAq7klDTj4Ps6fYG+1Fvi1YKde3aiXo65gDvNYonmuYQNb2 EaDvC9xjwc8OofOtXPj3L6nOn2lZhZflnP3BknzlgQ=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="sLdTjfuC22OKHu7 +QX1fqyTFWSs=">AAAC13icjVHJSsRAEH3GbdyjHr0EB1FBhkQG9Ch48ajguKAydNqemcZsd DouDIM38eoPeNU/Ev9A/8LqNoILoh2SvH5V73VXVZhFMte+/9zn9A8MDg1XRkbHxicmp9zpmb 08LRQXDZ5GqToIWS4imYiGljoSB5kSLA4jsR+ebZr4/rlQuUyTXX2ViZOYtRPZkpxpopruzJJ c8Y5jpjthq3vRa8rF5aZb9Wu+Xd5PEJSginJtp+4TjnGKFBwFYggk0IQjMOT0HCGAj4y4E3S JU4SkjQv0MEragrIEZTBiz+jbpt1RySa0N565VXM6JaJXkdLDAmlSylOEzWmejRfW2bC/eXet p7nbFf3D0ismVqND7F+6j8z/6kwtGi2s2xok1ZRZxlTHS5fCdsXc3PtUlSaHjDiDTymuCHOr/ OizZzW5rd30ltn4i800rNnzMrfAq7klDTj4Ps6fYG+1Fvi1YKde3aiXo65gDvNYonmuYQNb2 EaDvC9xjwc8OofOtXPj3L6nOn2lZhZflnP3BknzlgQ=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="sLdTjfuC22OKHu7 +QX1fqyTFWSs=">AAAC13icjVHJSsRAEH3GbdyjHr0EB1FBhkQG9Ch48ajguKAydNqemcZsd DouDIM38eoPeNU/Ev9A/8LqNoILoh2SvH5V73VXVZhFMte+/9zn9A8MDg1XRkbHxicmp9zpmb 08LRQXDZ5GqToIWS4imYiGljoSB5kSLA4jsR+ebZr4/rlQuUyTXX2ViZOYtRPZkpxpopruzJJ c8Y5jpjthq3vRa8rF5aZb9Wu+Xd5PEJSginJtp+4TjnGKFBwFYggk0IQjMOT0HCGAj4y4E3S JU4SkjQv0MEragrIEZTBiz+jbpt1RySa0N565VXM6JaJXkdLDAmlSylOEzWmejRfW2bC/eXet p7nbFf3D0ismVqND7F+6j8z/6kwtGi2s2xok1ZRZxlTHS5fCdsXc3PtUlSaHjDiDTymuCHOr/ OizZzW5rd30ltn4i800rNnzMrfAq7klDTj4Ps6fYG+1Fvi1YKde3aiXo65gDvNYonmuYQNb2 EaDvC9xjwc8OofOtXPj3L6nOn2lZhZflnP3BknzlgQ=</latexit>
w
<latexit sha1_base64="iyptNicMHgTc+/x s3kHxg5rPNGk=">AAACzXicjVHLSsNAFD2Nr1pfVZdugkVwVRIp6LLgxp0V7APbIkk6bYfmR TJRSq1bf8Ct/pb4B/oX3hmnoBbRCUnOnHvPmbn3urHPU2FZrzljYXFpeSW/Wlhb39jcKm7vNN IoSzxW9yI/SlqukzKfh6wuuPBZK06YE7g+a7qjUxlv3rAk5VF4KcYx6wbOIOR97jmCqKtO4Ii h25/cTq+LJatsqWXOA1uDEvSqRcUXdNBDBA8ZAjCEEIR9OEjpacOGhZi4LibEJYS4ijNMUSB tRlmMMhxiR/Qd0K6t2ZD20jNVao9O8elNSGnigDQR5SWE5WmmimfKWbK/eU+Up7zbmP6u9gqI FRgS+5dulvlfnaxFoI8TVQOnmmLFyOo87ZKprsibm1+qEuQQEydxj+IJYU8pZ302lSZVtcveO ir+pjIlK/eezs3wLm9JA7Z/jnMeNI7KtlW2LyqlakWPOo897OOQ5nmMKs5QQ528QzziCc/Gu ZEZd8b9Z6qR05pdfFvGwwfBlpOO</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="iyptNicMHgTc+/x s3kHxg5rPNGk=">AAACzXicjVHLSsNAFD2Nr1pfVZdugkVwVRIp6LLgxp0V7APbIkk6bYfmR TJRSq1bf8Ct/pb4B/oX3hmnoBbRCUnOnHvPmbn3urHPU2FZrzljYXFpeSW/Wlhb39jcKm7vNN IoSzxW9yI/SlqukzKfh6wuuPBZK06YE7g+a7qjUxlv3rAk5VF4KcYx6wbOIOR97jmCqKtO4Ii h25/cTq+LJatsqWXOA1uDEvSqRcUXdNBDBA8ZAjCEEIR9OEjpacOGhZi4LibEJYS4ijNMUSB tRlmMMhxiR/Qd0K6t2ZD20jNVao9O8elNSGnigDQR5SWE5WmmimfKWbK/eU+Up7zbmP6u9gqI FRgS+5dulvlfnaxFoI8TVQOnmmLFyOo87ZKprsibm1+qEuQQEydxj+IJYU8pZ302lSZVtcveO ir+pjIlK/eezs3wLm9JA7Z/jnMeNI7KtlW2LyqlakWPOo897OOQ5nmMKs5QQ528QzziCc/Gu ZEZd8b9Z6qR05pdfFvGwwfBlpOO</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="iyptNicMHgTc+/x s3kHxg5rPNGk=">AAACzXicjVHLSsNAFD2Nr1pfVZdugkVwVRIp6LLgxp0V7APbIkk6bYfmR TJRSq1bf8Ct/pb4B/oX3hmnoBbRCUnOnHvPmbn3urHPU2FZrzljYXFpeSW/Wlhb39jcKm7vNN IoSzxW9yI/SlqukzKfh6wuuPBZK06YE7g+a7qjUxlv3rAk5VF4KcYx6wbOIOR97jmCqKtO4Ii h25/cTq+LJatsqWXOA1uDEvSqRcUXdNBDBA8ZAjCEEIR9OEjpacOGhZi4LibEJYS4ijNMUSB tRlmMMhxiR/Qd0K6t2ZD20jNVao9O8elNSGnigDQR5SWE5WmmimfKWbK/eU+Up7zbmP6u9gqI FRgS+5dulvlfnaxFoI8TVQOnmmLFyOo87ZKprsibm1+qEuQQEydxj+IJYU8pZ302lSZVtcveO ir+pjIlK/eezs3wLm9JA7Z/jnMeNI7KtlW2LyqlakWPOo897OOQ5nmMKs5QQ528QzziCc/Gu ZEZd8b9Z6qR05pdfFvGwwfBlpOO</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="iyptNicMHgTc+/x s3kHxg5rPNGk=">AAACzXicjVHLSsNAFD2Nr1pfVZdugkVwVRIp6LLgxp0V7APbIkk6bYfmR TJRSq1bf8Ct/pb4B/oX3hmnoBbRCUnOnHvPmbn3urHPU2FZrzljYXFpeSW/Wlhb39jcKm7vNN IoSzxW9yI/SlqukzKfh6wuuPBZK06YE7g+a7qjUxlv3rAk5VF4KcYx6wbOIOR97jmCqKtO4Ii h25/cTq+LJatsqWXOA1uDEvSqRcUXdNBDBA8ZAjCEEIR9OEjpacOGhZi4LibEJYS4ijNMUSB tRlmMMhxiR/Qd0K6t2ZD20jNVao9O8elNSGnigDQR5SWE5WmmimfKWbK/eU+Up7zbmP6u9gqI FRgS+5dulvlfnaxFoI8TVQOnmmLFyOo87ZKprsibm1+qEuQQEydxj+IJYU8pZ302lSZVtcveO ir+pjIlK/eezs3wLm9JA7Z/jnMeNI7KtlW2LyqlakWPOo897OOQ5nmMKs5QQ528QzziCc/Gu ZEZd8b9Z6qR05pdfFvGwwfBlpOO</latexit>
Parameter ✓
<latexit sha1_base64="aN 8MSZkrK9YOkvIcGtKiTQDQBvw=">AAACyXicjVHLSsNAFD2 Nr1pfVZdugkVwVRIRdFlwI7ipYB/QFpmk03ZsmsRkItbiy h9wqz8m/oH+hXfGKahFdEKSM+fec2buvV4ciFQ6zmvOmptf WFzKLxdWVtfWN4qbW/U0yhKf1/woiJKmx1IeiJDXpJABb8Y JZyMv4A1veKLijRuepCIKL+Q45p0R64eiJ3wmiaq35YBLd lksOWVHL3sWuAaUYFY1Kr6gjS4i+MgwAkcISTgAQ0pPCy4c xMR1MCEuISR0nOMeBdJmlMUpgxE7pG+fdi3DhrRXnqlW+3R KQG9CSht7pIkoLyGsTrN1PNPOiv3Ne6I91d3G9PeM14hYi QGxf+mmmf/VqVokejjWNQiqKdaMqs43Lpnuirq5/aUqSQ4x cQp3KZ4Q9rVy2mdba1Jdu+ot0/E3nalYtfdNboZ3dUsasPt znLOgflB2nbJ7fliqHJpR57GDXezTPI9QwSmqqJH3FR7xhG frzLq2bq27z1QrZzTb+Lashw/b15Gb</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="aN 8MSZkrK9YOkvIcGtKiTQDQBvw=">AAACyXicjVHLSsNAFD2 Nr1pfVZdugkVwVRIRdFlwI7ipYB/QFpmk03ZsmsRkItbiy h9wqz8m/oH+hXfGKahFdEKSM+fec2buvV4ciFQ6zmvOmptf WFzKLxdWVtfWN4qbW/U0yhKf1/woiJKmx1IeiJDXpJABb8Y JZyMv4A1veKLijRuepCIKL+Q45p0R64eiJ3wmiaq35YBLd lksOWVHL3sWuAaUYFY1Kr6gjS4i+MgwAkcISTgAQ0pPCy4c xMR1MCEuISR0nOMeBdJmlMUpgxE7pG+fdi3DhrRXnqlW+3R KQG9CSht7pIkoLyGsTrN1PNPOiv3Ne6I91d3G9PeM14hYi QGxf+mmmf/VqVokejjWNQiqKdaMqs43Lpnuirq5/aUqSQ4x cQp3KZ4Q9rVy2mdba1Jdu+ot0/E3nalYtfdNboZ3dUsasPt znLOgflB2nbJ7fliqHJpR57GDXezTPI9QwSmqqJH3FR7xhG frzLq2bq27z1QrZzTb+Lashw/b15Gb</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="aN 8MSZkrK9YOkvIcGtKiTQDQBvw=">AAACyXicjVHLSsNAFD2 Nr1pfVZdugkVwVRIRdFlwI7ipYB/QFpmk03ZsmsRkItbiy h9wqz8m/oH+hXfGKahFdEKSM+fec2buvV4ciFQ6zmvOmptf WFzKLxdWVtfWN4qbW/U0yhKf1/woiJKmx1IeiJDXpJABb8Y JZyMv4A1veKLijRuepCIKL+Q45p0R64eiJ3wmiaq35YBLd lksOWVHL3sWuAaUYFY1Kr6gjS4i+MgwAkcISTgAQ0pPCy4c xMR1MCEuISR0nOMeBdJmlMUpgxE7pG+fdi3DhrRXnqlW+3R KQG9CSht7pIkoLyGsTrN1PNPOiv3Ne6I91d3G9PeM14hYi QGxf+mmmf/VqVokejjWNQiqKdaMqs43Lpnuirq5/aUqSQ4x cQp3KZ4Q9rVy2mdba1Jdu+ot0/E3nalYtfdNboZ3dUsasPt znLOgflB2nbJ7fliqHJpR57GDXezTPI9QwSmqqJH3FR7xhG frzLq2bq27z1QrZzTb+Lashw/b15Gb</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="aN 8MSZkrK9YOkvIcGtKiTQDQBvw=">AAACyXicjVHLSsNAFD2 Nr1pfVZdugkVwVRIRdFlwI7ipYB/QFpmk03ZsmsRkItbiy h9wqz8m/oH+hXfGKahFdEKSM+fec2buvV4ciFQ6zmvOmptf WFzKLxdWVtfWN4qbW/U0yhKf1/woiJKmx1IeiJDXpJABb8Y JZyMv4A1veKLijRuepCIKL+Q45p0R64eiJ3wmiaq35YBLd lksOWVHL3sWuAaUYFY1Kr6gjS4i+MgwAkcISTgAQ0pPCy4c xMR1MCEuISR0nOMeBdJmlMUpgxE7pG+fdi3DhrRXnqlW+3R KQG9CSht7pIkoLyGsTrN1PNPOiv3Ne6I91d3G9PeM14hYi QGxf+mmmf/VqVokejjWNQiqKdaMqs43Lpnuirq5/aUqSQ4x cQp3KZ4Q9rVy2mdba1Jdu+ot0/E3nalYtfdNboZ3dUsasPt znLOgflB2nbJ7fliqHJpR57GDXezTPI9QwSmqqJH3FR7xhG frzLq2bq27z1QrZzTb+Lashw/b15Gb</latexit>
⇡✓
<latexit sha1_base64="Vae5x0W5LAYqqhE YfJyZnP1k1yw=">AAAC2nicjVHLSsNAFD2N7/qqiis3wSK4KokUdFlw41LBaqEpZZJO26F5k UyEErpxJ279Abf6QeIf6F94Z0xBLaITkpw5954zc+91Y1+k0rJeS8bc/MLi0vJKeXVtfWOzsr V9lUZZ4vGmF/lR0nJZyn0R8qYU0uetOOEscH1+7Y5OVfz6hiepiMJLOY55J2CDUPSFxyRR3cq uEzA5dPu5E4tJN3fkkEs26VaqVs3Sy5wFdgGqKNZ5VHmBgx4ieMgQgCOEJOyDIaWnDRsWYuI 6yIlLCAkd55igTNqMsjhlMGJH9B3Qrl2wIe2VZ6rVHp3i05uQ0sQBaSLKSwir00wdz7SzYn/z zrWnutuY/m7hFRArMST2L9008786VYtEHye6BkE1xZpR1XmFS6a7om5ufqlKkkNMnMI9iieEP a2c9tnUmlTXrnrLdPxNZypW7b0iN8O7uiUN2P45zllwdVSzrZp9Ua826sWol7GHfRzSPI/Rw BnO0STvHI94wrPhGLfGnXH/mWqUCs0Ovi3j4QP6pJi0</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Vae5x0W5LAYqqhE YfJyZnP1k1yw=">AAAC2nicjVHLSsNAFD2N7/qqiis3wSK4KokUdFlw41LBaqEpZZJO26F5k UyEErpxJ279Abf6QeIf6F94Z0xBLaITkpw5954zc+91Y1+k0rJeS8bc/MLi0vJKeXVtfWOzsr V9lUZZ4vGmF/lR0nJZyn0R8qYU0uetOOEscH1+7Y5OVfz6hiepiMJLOY55J2CDUPSFxyRR3cq uEzA5dPu5E4tJN3fkkEs26VaqVs3Sy5wFdgGqKNZ5VHmBgx4ieMgQgCOEJOyDIaWnDRsWYuI 6yIlLCAkd55igTNqMsjhlMGJH9B3Qrl2wIe2VZ6rVHp3i05uQ0sQBaSLKSwir00wdz7SzYn/z zrWnutuY/m7hFRArMST2L9008786VYtEHye6BkE1xZpR1XmFS6a7om5ufqlKkkNMnMI9iieEP a2c9tnUmlTXrnrLdPxNZypW7b0iN8O7uiUN2P45zllwdVSzrZp9Ua826sWol7GHfRzSPI/Rw BnO0STvHI94wrPhGLfGnXH/mWqUCs0Ovi3j4QP6pJi0</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Vae5x0W5LAYqqhE YfJyZnP1k1yw=">AAAC2nicjVHLSsNAFD2N7/qqiis3wSK4KokUdFlw41LBaqEpZZJO26F5k UyEErpxJ279Abf6QeIf6F94Z0xBLaITkpw5954zc+91Y1+k0rJeS8bc/MLi0vJKeXVtfWOzsr V9lUZZ4vGmF/lR0nJZyn0R8qYU0uetOOEscH1+7Y5OVfz6hiepiMJLOY55J2CDUPSFxyRR3cq uEzA5dPu5E4tJN3fkkEs26VaqVs3Sy5wFdgGqKNZ5VHmBgx4ieMgQgCOEJOyDIaWnDRsWYuI 6yIlLCAkd55igTNqMsjhlMGJH9B3Qrl2wIe2VZ6rVHp3i05uQ0sQBaSLKSwir00wdz7SzYn/z zrWnutuY/m7hFRArMST2L9008786VYtEHye6BkE1xZpR1XmFS6a7om5ufqlKkkNMnMI9iieEP a2c9tnUmlTXrnrLdPxNZypW7b0iN8O7uiUN2P45zllwdVSzrZp9Ua826sWol7GHfRzSPI/Rw BnO0STvHI94wrPhGLfGnXH/mWqUCs0Ovi3j4QP6pJi0</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Vae5x0W5LAYqqhE YfJyZnP1k1yw=">AAAC2nicjVHLSsNAFD2N7/qqiis3wSK4KokUdFlw41LBaqEpZZJO26F5k UyEErpxJ279Abf6QeIf6F94Z0xBLaITkpw5954zc+91Y1+k0rJeS8bc/MLi0vJKeXVtfWOzsr V9lUZZ4vGmF/lR0nJZyn0R8qYU0uetOOEscH1+7Y5OVfz6hiepiMJLOY55J2CDUPSFxyRR3cq uEzA5dPu5E4tJN3fkkEs26VaqVs3Sy5wFdgGqKNZ5VHmBgx4ieMgQgCOEJOyDIaWnDRsWYuI 6yIlLCAkd55igTNqMsjhlMGJH9B3Qrl2wIe2VZ6rVHp3i05uQ0sQBaSLKSwir00wdz7SzYn/z zrWnutuY/m7hFRArMST2L9008786VYtEHye6BkE1xZpR1XmFS6a7om5ufqlKkkNMnMI9iieEP a2c9tnUmlTXrnrLdPxNZypW7b0iN8O7uiUN2P45zllwdVSzrZp9Ua826sWol7GHfRzSPI/Rw BnO0STvHI94wrPhGLfGnXH/mWqUCs0Ovi3j4QP6pJi0</latexit>
Fig. 2. Overview of DRL-SCCA design.
the state with the minimum potential value. In the following,
we illustrate the detailed design of the state representation,
agent action, reward design, and the policy network of the
agent, respectively. The pseudocode of DRL-SCCA is given
in Algorithm 2.
State Representation: The state observed by the agent
contains all players’ service chain composition strategies, i.e.,
w = (w1, · · · ,wN ).
Agent Action: We define each action taken by the agent as
a tuple. For example, the action (i,w′i) implies that the agent
decides to update the strategy of player i as w′i . Consequently,
the state evolves to w′ = (w1, · · · ,w′i, · · · ,wN ).
Reward Design: We define the reward as Φ(w)−Φ(w′), i.e.,
the difference between the potential value before and after the
agent takes the action. Such a reward setting unifies the ob-
jective of maximizing cumulative rewards and minimizing the
potential value. Following (7), the reward can be reformulated
as 2λiγ−Fi(VM) (ci(w) − ci(w′)).
Policy Network: We design the agent’s policy network as
a forward neural network (FNN) with one hidden layer of
dimension 2048, followed by a ReLu activation function, as
visualized in Figure 3. The policy network takes the observed
state w as input and the probability distribution piθ (·|w) as
output. We note that such a policy network design requires
the number of players N , the number of servers M , and the
number of VNF types F to be fixed. The change in any of
such numbers would require a reconstruction and re-training
of the policy network. Nevertheless, our design can serve as a
basis for more ingenious policy network design in the future.
We adopt the policy gradient (PG) method [23] to train the
policy network, aiming to maximize the cumulative rewards.
The key idea of PG is that if an action results in more rewards,
the agent will adjust its policy network so that next time when
observing the same state, it will be more likely to adopt such
an action. Likewise, the agent will reduce its willingness to
take the same action next time when observing the same state
if the action leads to few rewards.
Algorithm 2 DRL-based Service Chain Composition Algo-
rithm (DRL-SCCA)
Input: N players, each player i with a strategy set Wi .
Output: Service chain composition decision w
1: for each player i = 1, 2, . . . , N, do
2: Select a strategy wi uniformly randomly from Wi .
3: Initialize observed state w← (w1, . . . ,wi, . . . ,wN ).
4: for each iteration do
5: Acquire action (i,w′i) ← piθ (w).
6: Update w← (w1, . . . ,w′i, . . . ,wN ).
7: return w
…
…
…
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Fig. 3. Design of the policy network.
B. MCTS-based Service Chain Composition
In fact, the search for the optimal solution of problem (8)
can also be viewed as a sequential decision making process.
Particularly, in such a process, a solution can be attained by
determining the strategy for each player successively. There-
fore, problem (8) is equivalent to a tree-search problem with
respect to a decision tree. Each node in the tree corresponds
to an action selection state and each directed edge from the
node in the l-th layer to the child node in the (l + 1)-th layer
represents a particular strategy selection for the l-th player. For
example, the root node in the tree represents an empty state,
in which no player chooses any strategy. Each edge from the
root node represents a possible strategy selection for the first
player. Accordingly, the resulting child node corresponds to
the state after the selection. Consequently, each leaf node in
the tree corresponds to a feasible service chain composition
decision. In this way, solving problem (8) is equivalent to
searching for a path in the tree that leads to the leaf node
with the minimum potential value. Recall that problem (8)
is in general NP-hard with an enormous search space size.
Consequently, this implies a huge number of leaf nodes in the
decision tree, which makes a thorough search over all possible
paths impractical.
In recent years, Monte Carlo tree search (MCTS) methods
have been proven effective to solve large-scale complicated
tree-search problems [15]. The key idea of MCTS is that, in-
stead of building the whole tree in one shot, the search should
be carried out by constructing only part of the tree incre-
mentally. Specifically, MCTS maintains only those branches
that are the most promising to lead to the best leaf nodes
based on the estimation from a number of random sampling.
Such a randomized scheme, if properly applied, can achieve
a decent balance between tractability and optimality. Inspired
by such an idea, we propose an MCTS-based Service Chain
Composition Algorithm (MCTS-SCCA), that aims to search
the leaf node in the decision tree with the optimal solution of
the original problem (8). We show the pseudocode of MCTS-
SCCA in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 MCTS-based Service Chain Composition Algo-
rithm (MCTS-SCCA)
Input: N players, each player i with a strategy set Wi .
Output: Service chain composition decision w
1: Initialize set Z ← ∅.
2: for each player i = 1, 2, . . . , N, do
3: wi ← SELECT-STRATEGY(Z, i)
4: Update Z ← Z⋃{(i,wi)}.
5: return w
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Fig. 4. One-round sampling in MCTS-SCCA, where ND stands for “not
determined”. Si,k is the k-th strategy in the strategy set of player i. The leaf
node X corresponds to one feasible service chain composition decision w.
C. Design of MCTS-SCCA
To apply MCTS to problem (8), we associate each node η
in the decision tree with four variables: the number of times
node η has been visited N(η), its received cumulative reward
Q(η), the set of all child nodes C(η), and the set of unvisited
child nodes Cuntried(η). Basically, MCTS-SCCA successively
selects the most promising strategy for each player with rounds
of random sampling. The assignment state, denoted by Z,
includes the pairs of players and their strategies. Upon the
strategy selection for player i, Z contains the strategies of
players 1, . . . , i − 1. We define n(Z) as the current node. For
example, in Figure 4 step 1, we have Z = {(1, S1,3), (2, S2,1)},
and the current node n(Z) is G. MCTS-SCCA proceeds as
shown in Algorithm 4.
Starting from node n(Z) for the assignment stateZ, MCTS-
SCCA will take a series of sampling rounds (lines 3-10 in
Algorithm 4) to estimate the “advantage” of choosing each
strategy wi for player i. Figure 4 shows how MCTS-SCCA
proceeds within one round of sampling.
At the beginning of each round of sampling, MCTS-SCCA
maintains a partial tree which contains nodes that have been
marked as visited in previous rounds. Then MCTS-SCCA
takes the following four steps to carry out the sampling.
1) Selection: MCTS-SCCA first takes a path from the root
node over the partially constructed tree. In such a process,
the selection of child nodes must address the exploitation-
exploration dilemma: should MCTS-SCCA choose the child
node with the highest empirical mean, or should it explore
those rarely visited child nodes that may possibly result in
even better performance? To this end, MCTS-SCCA maintains
an upper-confidence-bound (UCB) value for each node (line
27 in Algorithm 4), which equals the weighted sum of an
exploration term (the average reward through that node) and
an exploitation term. Note that, in MCTS-SCCA, we set the
Algorithm 4 Sub-functions for MCTS-SCCA
1: function SELECT-STRATEGY(Z, i)
2: Initialize k ← 0.
3: while k < MAX SAMPLE NUM do
4: (n(Z′), i′) ← TRAVERSE(Z, i)
5: If n(Z′) is not a leaf:
6: Φ← SIMULATE(Z′, i′)
7: Else:
8: Φ← Φ(Z′)
9: BACK PROP(Z′,Φ)
10: k ← k + 1
11: ηbest ← BEST CHILD(n(Z), 0)
12: return strategy wi that leads from n(Z) to ηbest
13:
14: function TRAVERSE(Z, i)
15: Initialize Z′←Z, η← n(Z′) and i′← i.
16: while η is not a leaf do
17: if Cuntried(η) , ∅ then
18: Pick η′ ∈ Cuntried(η) uniformly at random.
19: Set Z′←Z′ ∪ {η′}.
20: return (n(Z′), i′)
21: else
22: Set η← BEST CHILD(η,√2).
23: Set i′← i′ + 1.
24: return (η, i′)
25:
26: function BEST CHILD(η, ω)
27: return arg max
η′∈C(η)
Q(η′)
N (η′) + ω
√
2 ln N (η)
N (η′)
28:
29: function SIMULATE(Z, i)
30: Initialize Z′←Z, i′← i.
31: while i′ < n do
32: Pick a strategy w ∈ Wi′+1 uniformly at random.
33: Set i′← i′ + 1.
34: Set Z′←Z′ ∪ {(i′,w)}.
35: return Φ(Z′)
36:
37: function BACK PROP(η, Φ)
38: while η is not the root node do
39: Set N(η) ← N(η) + 1 and Q(η) ← Q(η) − Φ.
40: Set η← parent(η).
weight ω for the exploration term as
√
2 which is a widely
adopted empirical choice [15]. Intuitively, the second term
will be large if a node has been visited rarely given that its
parent node has been visited for a large number of times. The
traversal stops by an anchor node, which is either a leaf node
or some node with any unvisited child node. If stopped by a
leaf node, then directly jumps to step 3) .
2) Expansion: If stopped by a non-leaf node with unvisited
child nodes, MCTS-SCCA picks one of the unvisited child
nodes of the anchor node randomly, then marks the selected
child node as visited, and adds it to the partial tree.
3) Simulation: Given the selected child node with the cor-
responding assignment state, MCTS-SCCA will take a random
path leading to some leaf node. In other words, MCTS-SCCA
will uniformly randomly pick a strategy for each unassigned
player and yield a feasible decision w.
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4) Back-propagation: MCTS-SCCA will use the potential
value Φ(w) of the eventually reached leaf node to update the
values of N(η) and Q(η) for each node η along the path.
With the updated estimated rewards based on rounds of
sampling, MCTS-SCCA chooses the current root node’s best
child node with the maximum empirical mean reward (line 11
in Algorithm 4 with parameter ω = 0). Then MCTS-SCCA
sets the chosen child node as the new root and conducts a
new series of random sampling over the new root’s tree. Such
a process will be repeated until the chosen child node is a leaf
node. MCTS-SCCA will output the corresponding state as the
final service chain composition decision.
D. Discussion
Compared to centralized schemes DRL-SCCA and MCTS-
SCCA, the distributed implementations of MA-SCCA and
MH-SCCA conduce to better adaptability. Though limited
to centralized implementations without provable performance
guarantee, DRL-SCCA and MCTS-SCCA take other advan-
tages. For DRL-SCCA, it solves problem (8) in a data-driven
and model-free fashion. In other words, the design of DRL-
SCCA does not require specific domain knowledge about the
problem itself. The crux lies in the design of reward signals,
the representations of states and agent actions, respectively.
However, DRL-SCCA requires a large amount of time for
pre-training before applied to the practical system. For MCTS-
SCCA, it enjoys a low computational complexity that is pro-
portional to the number of players and the number of samples
(MAX SAMPLE NUM). However, insufficient sampling may
result in solutions that are far from optimum.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of MA-SCCA,
MH-SCCA, DRL-SCCA, and MCTS-SCCA under various
scenarios. In the following, we first illustrate the basic settings
and the baseline scheme adopted in our simulation, then we
show the simulation results and the corresponding analysis.
A. Simulation Settings
We adopt the following settings in our simulation by default
unless otherwise specified. All simulation results are obtained
by averaging the results from 100 runs.
Basic Settings: We consider an NFV system equipped with
five servers. Each server holds three instances, corresponding
to three commonly adopted VNFs, viz. Firewall (FW), Load
Balancer (LB), and Intrusion Detection System (IDS). We set
the latency between any gateway router r ∈ R and any VM
v ∈ V, and the latency between any two VMs within the same
server uniformly as one unit of time. The latency between
any other pair of VMs is uniformly sampled from the interval
[2, 6]. In the meantime, we consider ten players, each with a
traffic rate of 5Mbps and a failure cost of Ω = 1000 units. All
players are assumed to subscribe the same service chain, i.e.,
FW → LB → IDS. Besides, the VM survival probability and
user survival probability are both set to 0.9. By viewing latency
reduction and congestion mitigation as equally important, we
set α = 1. For MA-SCCA and MH-SCCA, we set β = 0.1.
Under such settings, there are multiple Nash equilibria with
sub-optimal potential values, and the optimal potential value
should be about 1575 units.
Baseline: We adopt the Unilateral Service Chain Selection
(USCS) scheme [5] as a baseline. The implementation of
USCS is as follows. Initially, each player randomly picks one
strategy from its strategy space. Then players take turns to
make strategy changes. In each iteration, the chosen player
will change its strategy to the one that minimizes its own cost.
Such a procedure ends if no players are willing to change its
strategy.6 Similar to MH-SCCA, USCS is also a distributed
scheme because each player can act individually. However,
the complexity within each iteration of USCS is very high
because it requires a thorough search over the strategy space
to find the strategy with the minimum cost. In fact, USCS is
some kind of “best response” scheme. Such schemes usually
run fast, but may fall into some local optima, inducing inferior
system performances.
Scheme Settings: We assume the NFV system proceeds on
a time-slot basis. For MA-SCCA, MH-SCCA, DRL-SCCA,
and USCS, they run one iteration within each time slot.
Considering the difference among their computational com-
plexities, we set the time slot length as one second for USCS,
MA-SCCA and DRL-SCCA, and ten milliseconds for MH-
SCCA. Particularly, the mean of the Poisson clock is set as 100
and 1 millisecond for MA-SCCA and MH-SCCA, respectively.
For DRL-SCCA, we train its policy network by setting the
learning rate as 0.0001. For MCTS-SCCA, we do not consider
any time slot settings since the service chain composition is
completed in one shot and remains unchanged all the time.
B. Performance Comparison
To evaluate the performance of the proposed schemes, we
consider two different metrics: the potential value in (6) and
the weighted average cost which is defined as
C¯ ,
1
N
∑
i∈N
λici(wi,w−i). (29)
Under the default simulation settings, the minimum weighted
average cost should be about 1826 units.
Figure 5 shows the comparison results of USCS, MA-
SCCA, MH-SCCA, DRL-SCCA, and MCTS-SCCA in terms
of (a) potential value and (b) weighted average cost. The pre-
training times for DRL-SCCA and MCTS-SCCA are half an
hour and three minutes, respectively. We have the following
observations: 1) The curves in Figures 5(a) and 5(b) are very
similar, which verifies the proportional relationship between
the local change of cost and the global change of potential
value as shown in (7). 2) The curves of all schemes except
MCTS-SCCA start from the same point because all these
schemes begin with a random initialization of all players’
strategies; 3) USCS converges very fast, but it only reaches
some local optimum, and stays unchanged. 4) Compared with
USCS, MA-SCCA achieves both a smaller potential value and
a lower weighted average cost. 5) Compared with MA-SCCA,
the curves of MH-SCCA converges faster, because MH-SCCA
has a lower computational complexity. Nonetheless, after a
period of time, the two curves coincide eventually. The reason
is that, with the same value of β = 0.1, MA-SCCA and MH-
SCCA result in the same stationary distribution (13), resulting
in the same expected potential value and expected weighted
average cost. 6) DRL-SCCA outperforms all other schemes in
terms of both potential value and weighted average cost. The
reason is that it has been trained in advance for about half an
hour, and can guide the players towards the optimal system
performance at runtime. 7) Using only three minutes to make
decisions in advance, MCTS-SCCA reaches good performance
which is in between USCS and MH-SCCA.
6Note that MA-SCCA will degrade to USCS by setting β →∞.
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Fig. 5. Comparison of USCS, MA-SCCA, MH-SCCA, DRL-SCCA, and
MCTS-SCCA in terms of (a) potential value and (b) weighted average cost.
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Fig. 6. Performance of MH-SCCA under various values of β in terms of (a)
potential value and (b) weighted average cost.
Both DRL-SCCA and MCTS-SCCA are static schemes,
which are not suitable for NFV systems with frequent dynam-
ics. In addition, MA-SCCA and MH-SCCA are very similar,
but the complexity of MA-SCCA is much more higher. Based
on the above considerations, in the following simulations, we
concentrate on only two schemes: USCS and MH-SCCA.
C. Evaluation of USCS and MH-SCCA
Figure 6 presents the results of MH-SCCA under different
values of β. We find that both the potential value and the
weighted average cost after convergence decrease as the value
of β increases. However, a larger value of β requires more time
to converge to the stationary state. For example, the curve
of β = 0.01 in Figure 6(a) oscillates around 2160 within
only one second, while the curve of β = 0.1 goes down
continuously after even 50 seconds. Let’s consider an extreme
case where β is close to infinity. In this case, MH-SCCA may
sink into some local optimum. It is almost impossible to reach
the global optimum and achieve the stationary distribution.
Therefore, in practical NFV systems, an appropriate value of β
needs to be selected to obtain both good time-averaged system
performance and fast convergence.
Figure 7 compares USCS and MH-SCCA under different
values of (a) number of players N and (b) number of VNF
types F.7 We have the following observations: 1) Given that
there is only one player (N = 1 in Figure 7(a)) or the service
chain consists of only one VNF (F = 1 in Figure 7(b)),
USCS and MH-SCCA behave similarly because there is no
local optima but only one global optimum. 2) Under all other
settings, MH-SCCA outperforms USCS. Moreover, the gap
increases as the number of players N (the number of VNF
types F) increases.
7We assume that all players have the same service chain that consists of
all types of VNFs in a specified order. Therefore, the number of VNF types
is equivalent to the length of players’ service chains.
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Fig. 7. Potential value of MH-SCCA under different settings of (a) number
of players N and (b) number of VNF types F .
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(b) VM dynamics.
Fig. 8. Weighted average cost v.s. time when (a) a new player joins and (b)
a VM fails at the 40-th second.
D. Adaptivity
In practice, users often join and leave the NFV system
dynamically [24]. Moreover, a VM may break down unex-
pectedly due to various reasons such as network issues and
power outages [11]. Therefore, we investigate the adaptivity
of MH-SCCA in response to such dynamics.
We run the simulation for 100 seconds, and a new player
with traffic rate 10Mbps will join at the 40-th second. Once
the new player joins, it picks a strategy from its strategy
space randomly and starts an exponential count-down clock
of rate µ. Figure 8(a) presents the corresponding performance
of MH-SCCA. We see that when the new player joins, the
weighted average cost increases immediately and sharply.
This is because the arrival of the new player increases the
congestion costs of some players. Then, within a short period
(less than five seconds), the weighted average cost decreases
and converges again. Results from Figure 8(a) show the rapid
adaptivity of MH-SCCA when faced with player dynamics.
We also consider possible VM failures in the simulation.
Specifically, We run the simulation for 100 seconds, and turn
off a specific VM at the 40-th second. If one VM breaks down,
all traffics on it will be migrated to another randomly selected
VM of the same VNF type. Figure 8(b) shows that when the
VM is down, the weighted average cost rises up immediately
because the random migration may cause imbalance and incur
high congestion cost. Then, within a short period (less than
twenty seconds), the weighted average cost converges again.
Results from Figure 8(b) show the rapid adaptivity of MH-
SCCA when faced with VM dynamics.
E. Failures
In this part we investigate how different failure probabilities
affect the performance of MH-SCCA. Table III shows the
weighted average cost under different values of γ¯(VM) and
γ¯(user) while the number of VNF types (service chain length)
is F = 2. From this table, we see that the weighted average
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TABLE III
WEIGHTED AVERAGE COST UNDER DIFFERENT VALUES OF γ¯(VM) AND
γ¯(user) WITH F = 2.
γ¯(user)
γ¯(VM) 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0 117.3 1045 1875 2607.5 3242.2 3779.3
0.1 602.3 1437.9 2185.5 2845.2 3416.8 3900.6
0.2 1088.2 1831.5 2496.5 3083.2 3591.8 4022.1
0.3 1575 2225.8 2808 3321.8 3767 4143.8
0.4 2062.5 2620.6 3120 3560.6 3942.5 4265.6
0.5 2550.7 3016.1 3432.5 3799.9 4118.3 4387.7
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Fig. 9. Weighted average cost v.s. failure probability of player (green stripped
bar) and VM under different values of F .
cost increases from left to right, and from top to bottom. In
summary, a larger failure probability (whether player or VM)
incurs a higher weighted average cost.
In Figure 9(a), we present the first row and the first column
of Table III. The red meshed bars represent the case when
γ¯(VM) increases from 0 to 0.5 and γ¯(user) is set as 0 by default
(the first row). Similarly the green stripped bars represent the
case when γ¯(user) ranges from 0 to 0.5 and γ¯(VM) = 0 (the
first column). Figure 9(b) presents similar results but under
the setting of F = 3.
From Figure 9, we see that the red meshed bars are always
higher than the corresponding green stripped bars. In other
words, with the same failure probability, the impact of VM
failures on the weighted average cost is greater than that of
player failures. The reason is that multiple VMs are employed
to serve a single player, magnifying the impact of VM failures.
Comparing Figure 9(a) and 9(b), we find that with a fixed
failure probability (e.g., 0.1), the gap between the red and
green bars in Figure 9(b) (127%) is larger than that in Figure
9(a) (73%). The reason is that the impact of VM failures
aggravates further as the length of service chains grows.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the service chain composition prob-
lem in NFV systems with both user and virtual machine fail-
ures. By formulating the problem from the perspective of non-
cooperative game, we showed that such a game is a weighted
potential game. Then we proposed MA-SCCA, a distributed
scheme that guides the chain composition of different users
in the system to the Nash equilibrium state with near-optimal
request latencies and network congestion. Moreover, by adopt-
ing Metropolis-Hastings methods, we proposed MH-SCCA, a
variant of MA-SCCA, to further accelerate the composition
process. In addition, we devised two novel learning-aided
schemes, namely DRL-SCCA and MCTS-SCCA, based on
DRL and MCTS techniques, respectively. We conducted both
theoretical analysis and numerical simulations to demonstrate
the effectiveness of our proposed schemes. The simulation
results also validate the adaptivity of MH-SCCA when faced
with network dynamics.
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APPENDICES
A. Proof of Theorem 1
We consider two states w = (wi,w−i) and w′ = (w′i,w−i)
that involves only player i’s strategy change. By the definition
of cost function in (5), we have
ci(w) − ci(w′)
= γ(user) · γFi(VM) ·
(
αc(L)i (wi) − αc(L)i (w′i)
)
+ γ(user) · γFi(VM) ·
(
c(C)i (w) − c(C)i (w′)
)
.
(30)
By the definition of Φ in (6), we have
Φ(w) − Φ(w′) = 2γ(user) · λi
[
αc(L)i (wi) − αc(L)i (w′i)
]
+
∑
v∈V
[( ∑
k∈Nv (w)
γ(user) · λk
)2
−
( ∑
k∈Nv (w′)
γ(user) · λk
)2]
.
(31)
Next, we focus on the second summation term on the right-
hand side in (31). The set of VMs V can be divided into the
following subsets.
 V1: VMs adopted by player i in wi but not in w′i; V2: VMs adopted in w′i but not in wi; V3: VMs that are both adopted in wi and w′i; V4: VMs that are adopted neither in wi nor w′i .
Note that we always have |V1 | = |V2 | because for any VM v
such that v ∈ wi and v < w′i , there must exist another VM v′
such that v′ ∈ w′i, and v′ < wi . Therefore, we have∑
v∈V
[( ∑
k∈Nv (w)
γ(user)λk
)2
−
( ∑
k∈Nv (w′)
γ(user)λk
)2]
=
∑
v∈V1
[( ∑
k∈Nv (w)
γ(user)λk
)2
−
( ∑
k∈Nv (w)
γ(user)λk − γ(user)λi
)2]
+
∑
v∈V2
[( ∑
k∈Nv (w′)
γ(user)λk − γ(user)λi
)2
−
( ∑
k∈Nv (w′)
γ(user)λk
)2]
= 2γ(user)λi
[ ∑
v∈V1
( ∑
k∈Nv (w)
γ(user)λk
)
−
∑
v∈V2
( ∑
k∈Nv (w′)
γ(user)λk
)]
= 2γ(user)λi
[ ∑
v∈R1
∑
k∈Nv (w)/{i }
γ(user)λk −
∑
v∈V2
∑
k∈Nv (w′)/{i }
γ(user)λk
]
= 2γ(user)λi
[ ∑
v∈V1
δi,v(w) −
∑
v∈V2
δi,v(w)
]
= 2γ(user)λi
(
c(C)i (w) − c(C)i (w′)
)
.
(32)
Combining (30), (31) and (32), we obtain
Φ(w) − Φ(w′) = 2λiγ−Fi(VM) (ci(w) − ci(w′)) . (33)
B. Proof of Theorem 2
Recall that w∗ denotes the solution to problem (8), i.e., w∗ =
arg minw∈W Φ(w). Therefore, we have
exp [−βΦ(w∗)] ≤
∑
w∈W
exp[−βΦ(w)] ≤ |W| exp [−βΦ(w∗)] .
(34)
Next, we define
gβ = − 1
β
log
( ∑
w∈W
exp[−βΦ(w)]
)
. (35)
By combining (34) and (35), we have
Φ(w∗) − 1
β
log |W| ≤ gβ ≤ Φ(w∗). (36)
According to the property of conjugate function [25], we know
that gβ equals the optimal value of problem (12). Therefore,
the optimality gap is bounded by
1
β
log |W| = 1
β
log
( ∏
i∈N
MFi
)
≤ 1
β
FN log M . (37)
C. Proof of Theorem 3
To show the time-reversibility of the Markov chain, we first
show that it satisifies the following properties.
 The topology of the Markov chain is connected. In the
topology, the Hamming distance Hw,w′ equals the number
of transitions needed to reach state w′ from w. From the
definition of Hamming distance in (14), we conclude that
Hw,w′ ≤ N for any two states w, w′. Therefore, any state
pairs are reachable within N transitions, thus the designed
topology is connected.
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 Given any state w ∈ W, the probabilities of transitions
out of it sum to one. Specifically,∑
w′∈W
pw,w′ =
∑
w′∈W
Hw,w′=0
pw,w′ +
∑
w′∈W
Hw,w′=1
pw,w′
=
1
N
∑
i∈N
exp[−βΦ(w)]∑
w¯∈Ai exp[−βΦ(w¯)]
+
∑
i∈N
∑
wˆ∈Ai
wˆ,w
1
N
exp[−βΦ(wˆ)]∑
w¯∈Ai exp[−βΦ(w¯)]
=
1
N
∑
i∈N
∑
wˆ∈Ai exp[−βΦ(wˆ)]∑
w¯∈Ai exp[−βΦ(w¯)]
= 1.
(38)
 The transition probabilities between any two states satisfy
the detailed balance equation. First, the detailed balance
equation is naturally satisfied for state self transition.
Next, for any two connected states w and w′, by (13)
and (21), we have
pi∗wpw,w′
=
exp[−βΦ(w)]∑
w¯∈W exp[−βΦ(w¯)]
· 1
N
exp[−βΦ(w′)]∑
w¯∈Ai exp[−βΦ(w¯)]
=
exp[−βΦ(w′)]∑
w¯∈W exp[−βΦ(w¯)]
· 1
N
exp[−βΦ(w)]∑
w¯∈Ai exp[−βΦ(w¯)]
=pi∗w′pw′,w.
(39)
Therefore, the designed Markov chain is irreducible. More-
over, it is also aperiodic because of the existence of self-
transitions. Besides, it also satisfies the detailed balance equa-
tions. Hence, according to Chapter 11 in [26], we say the
resultant Markov chain is time-reversible with its stationary
distribution as (13).
D. Proof of Theorem 4
We first focus on bounding the mixing time of MH-SCCA.
In MH-SCCA, we denote the Markov chain’s transition prob-
ability matrix by P. By (21) and (19), for two states w and
w′ that differ at player i’s strategy, we have
Pw,w′ = qw,w′aw,w′ =
1
N |Wi | min
[
exp(−βΦ(w′))
exp(−βΦ(w)) , 1
]
. (40)
Then, we construct a new discrete-time Markov chain with
transition probability matrix Plazy = 12 (I + P) where I is the
identity matrix. The self transition probability Plazyw,w =
1
2 +
Pw,w ≥ 12 , so we say such Markov chain is “lazy”. For any
two different states w and w′, the new transition probability
is Plazyw,w′ =
1
2Pw,w′ . Such lazy Markov chain admits the same
stationary distribution as the original one, because the equality
pi∗wPw,w′ = pi∗wPw,w′ implies pi∗wP
lazy
w,w′ = pi
∗
wP
lazy
w,w′ .
We state that the mixing time of MH-SCCA is upper-
bounded by the mixing time of the corresponding lazy Markov
chain. Based on the Geometric method in [20], we have
tmix(ε) ≤
log( 12ε ) + 12 log( 1pimin − 1)
log( 1λ2m )
, (41)
where pimin is the minimum stationary probability, and λ2m is
the second largest eigenvalue of the transition matrix Plazy. To
find an upper bound for the mixing time, we need to bound
both pimin and λ2m. Firstly we give a lower bound of pimin:
pimin = minw∈W pi
∗
w =
minw∈W exp [−βΦ(w)]∑
w¯∈W exp [−βΦ(w¯)]
≥ exp(−βD)|W| ≥
exp(−βD)
MNF
,
(42)
in which D is the difference between the maximum and
minimum potential values as defined in (28). Now we bound
λ2m by Cheegers inequality [20]:
λ2m ≤ 1 − ϕ
2
2
, (43)
in which ϕ is the “conductance” of Plazy defined as
ϕ , min
A⊂W,piA∈(0, 12 ]
F(A, Ac)
piA
, (44)
where F(A, Ac) , ∑w∈A,w′∈Ac pi∗wPlazyw,w′ and piA , ∑w∈A pi∗w.
Next, we show a lower bound of ϕ. Specifically,
ϕ ≥ min
A⊂W,piA∈(0, 12 ]
2F(A, Ac)
≥ min
w,w′,Plazyw,w′>0
2pi∗wP
lazy
w,w′
≥ min
w,w′,Pw,w′>0
pi∗wPw,w′
≥ pimin 1N |Wi | exp(−βD)
≥ exp(−2βD)
NMF(N+1)
.
(45)
Combining (43) and (45), we have
λ2m ≤ 1 − exp(−4βD)2N2M2F(N+1) . (46)
Substituting (42) and (46) into (41), we have that the mixing
time of MH-SCCA is bounded by
tmix(ε) ≤
log( 12ε ) + 12FN log M + 12 βD
− log[1 − 12N2M2F (N+1) exp (−4βD)]
. (47)
When it comes to MA-SCCA, we denote its transition proba-
bility matrix as Q. Then for two different states w and w′,
Qw,w′ =
1
N
exp[−βΦ(w′)]∑
w¯∈Ai exp[−βΦ(w¯)]
(48)
and
Qlazyw,w′ =
1
2
Qw,w′ . (49)
Similar to (45), we derive the lower bound of the conductance
of transition matrix Qlazy as
ϕ ≥ pimin 1N
exp[−βΦ(w′)]∑
w¯∈Ai exp[−βΦ(w¯)]
≥ exp(−2βD)
NMF(N+1)
,
(50)
which is the same as (45). Therefore, MA-SCCA has the same
mixing time upper bound (47) as MH-SCCA, thus the proof
of Theorem 4 is completed.
